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COMMENTS
THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
INTERPRETATION OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES IN UNITED STATES v.
MacDONALt THE EROSION OF THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution1 was
framed and adopted to protect individuals from unreasonable in-
vasions of their privacy and security.2 To deter arbitrary searches
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Id.
2 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (arbitrary searches and seizures
motivated adoption of fourth amendment); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d
Cir.)(fourth amendment protects "reasonable expectations of privacy"), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 913 (1978).
The fourth amendment was adopted to prevent governmental intrusions similar to
those that had occurred under British rule. See R. DAvis, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
§ 1.11, at 3-5 (1964). In an effort to suppress the smuggling trade during colonial times,
British officials utilized "general warrants," or "writs of assistance," to authorize the search
of private premises. See E. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3, at 4-5 (1970). These general
warrants gave government officials the discretion to enter and search any premises sus-
pected of housing smuggled goods. See id. This general search power was widely abused,
and hatred of the practice was a strong motivating factor behind the Revolutionary War.
See Grayson, The Warrant Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CraM. L. 107, 108 (1987).
After the war, memory of the writs lingered on, and the omission from the Constitution
of any provision dealing with searches and seizures was the subject of national criticism. See
1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 1.1(a), at 4-5 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. LAFAvE,
SEARCHES]. To remedy this deficiency, the fourth amendment was designed "to place obsta-
cles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581, 595 (1948). "This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven
for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to in-
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and seizures, the fourth amendment requires law enforcement of-
ficers to procure a warrant before entering uninvited upon private
premises.' Realizing, however, that an absolute warrant require-
vade ... [an individual's] privacy in order to enforce the law." McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
The fourth amendment has spawned much controversial litigation, but the holdings of
the many cases are often difficult to reconcile. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
618-19 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing inconsistency of decisions). "No area
of the law has more bedeviled the judiciary, from the Justices of the Supreme Court down to
the magistrate .... ." LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . .Has
Not . . .Run Smooth", 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 255 [hereinafter LaFave, True Law]. The
reason for the inconsistency seems to stem from a combination of the amendment's ambigu-
ity, see 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARcHEs, supra, § 1.1(a), at 5, and the reality that a court's determi-
nation that a search was unreasonable is likely to result in freedom for a guilty defendant.
See LaFave, True Law, supra.
Despite their natural disdain for allowing "[t]he criminal ... to go free because the
constable has blundered," People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied,
270 U.S. 657 (1926), the courts have generally maintained their focus on the fundamental
nature of the rights protected by the fourth amendment See Payton, 445 U.S. at 597 ("free-
dom of one's house" is vital to liberty). They recognize that "[t]he security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police... is basic to a free society," Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
have applied the protections of the fourth amendment "to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctit[ies] of a man's home and the privacies of life."
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885), overruled
on other grounds by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
s See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453 ("with few exceptions," police must show probable
cause and obtain warrant from magistrate before entering private premises); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 & n.3 (1948) (fourth amendment requires that magistrate,
rather than police officer, make determination of sufficient probable cause to enter private
premises); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("judicial officer...
determine[s] whether the security of our society... requires that the right of privacy yield
to a right of entry, search and seizure"); see also Note, Police Practices and the Threatened
Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1469 (1971). "Requiring a magis-
trate to determine probable cause before a search may provide protection against searches
without probable cause ... by substituting the decision of an outsider for that of a police-
man who may be too excited, prejudiced, or uninformed to make an accurate judgment." Id.
"The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in... [Supreme Court] decisions
reflects the 'basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and
levels of Government.'" Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (quoting United
States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972), modified sub nom. United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
If it is determined that law enforcement officials made an illegal warrantless entry into
private premises, the evidence obtained in the course of the ensuing search will be excluded
from the defendant's trial. See Comment, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 57 TuL. L. REV. 648, 648 (1983). The principal purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter lawless conduct by police officers, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12
(1968), but its effectiveness in that capacity has been the subject of vigorous debate for
many years. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARcHEs, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 21. The rule has endured,
however, primarily because no "meaningful alternative" has been found. Id. § 1.2(c), at 31.
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ment would severely impede effective law enforcement, courts have
concluded that law officers need not obtain a warrant when con-
fronted with an "immediate major crisis" or "exigent circum-
stances."' 4 Nonetheless, courts have remained alert to, and have
struck down, attempts by law officers to circumvent the fourth
amendment by simply manufacturing exigencies. 5 Recently, how-
ever, in United States v. MacDonald,6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit substantially expanded the exigent-
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement by concluding
that law enforcement officials, provided they act "in an entirely
lawful manner," may make a warrantless entry into a private
apartment pursuant to an exigency of their own making.7
4 See Reed, 572 F.2d at 424. Warrantless entries by law enforcement officials are sanc-
tioned only in "a few specifically established and well-delineated situations." Vale v. Louisi-
ana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Failure
to obtain a warrant is justified, for example, when the situation involves "exigent circum-
stances." See Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-88. "The phrase 'exigent circumstances' refers gener-
ally to those situations in which law enforcement agents will be unable or unlikely to effec-
tuate an arrest, search or seizure, for which probable cause exists, unless they act swiftly
and, without seeking prior judicial authorization." United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22,
25 (2d Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 550 (6th Cir.) ("exigent
circumstances" require probability that "risk will become a reality"), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
952 (1980); 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 4.1(a), at 119 (exigency exception "nar-
rowly circumscribed" when search requires entry to private premises).
Although the warrant requirement is dispensed with under exceptional circumstances, a
warrant "is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police effi-
ciency." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971). "It is, or should be, an im-
portant working part of our machinery of government," operating to protect the public from
"overzealous" law enforcement officials. Id. At least one commentator, however, while ac-
knowledging a stricter trend, has concluded that many courts employ a relatively broad
interpretation of "exigent circumstances" that allows routine approval of intrusive police
action. See Note, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection
of the Castle, 82 DICK. L. Rlv. 167, 180-81 (1977).
5 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ar-
rest of suspect timed to create exigency renders warrantless search or arrest of other sus-
pects unlawful); United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1981) (warrantless
search invalid when agents deliberately create exigent circumstances), aff'd, 468 U.S. 796
(1984); United States v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980) (courts must beware of
attempts by agents to terrorize occupants of premises in hopes of creating exigency), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 6.5(b), at 662 (claims
of exigent circumstances have been rejected when "police unnecessarily warn[] those within
by seeking to question them or by asking for their consent to search the premises"); see also
Note, Warrantless Residential Searches to Prevent the Destruction of Evidence: A Need
For Strict Standards, 70 J. CluM. L. & CRIBMOLOOY 255, 267 (1979) ("if police were able to
forego the warrant requirement by creating an emergency, then the fourth amendment
would become a nullity").
8 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
7Id. at 772. "[T]he fact that the agent may be 'interested' in having the occupants
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In MacDonald, agents of the New York Drug Enforcement
Task Force, having acquired persuasive evidence that a narcotics
enterprise was operating from a Manhattan apartment that they
had under surveillance, planned an undercover drug purchase.8
Shortly before ten o'clock one evening, one of the agents gained
entry to the apartment and purchased a package of marijuana us-
ing a prerecorded five dollar bill.' The agent then left the premises
and reported to the task force that he had observed six men, two
guns, large quantities of cash, and what appeared to be marijuana
and cocaine within the apartment."
Approximately ten minutes after the undercover purchase,"
without any discussion concerning the procurement of a warrant, 2
seven of the task force agents approached the apartment.'3 The
agents knocked on the apartment door and identified themselves."
Immediately, they perceived "the sounds of shuffling feet" from
within the apartment and were notified by a radio communication
from agents stationed outside that the occupants of the premises
were attempting to flee through a window.'5 After forcing entry
into the premises with a battering ram, the agents arrested five of
the suspects, including MacDonald, and seized the weapons,
react in a way that provides exigent circumstances and may 'fully expect[]' such a reaction
does not invalidate action that is otherwise lawful." Id. (quoting Horton v. California, 110 S.
Ct. 2301, 2308 (1990)).
1 Id. at 768. The agents had been advised by a confidential informant that two apart-
ments within a certain Manhattan apartment building were being used in a narcotics traf-
ficking operation. Id. Surveillance was established outside the building, and the agents ob-
served a steady stream of persons making brief visits to a first-floor apartment. United
States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. United States v. MacDon-
ald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991). The agents
stopped a car that they followed from the apartment building and questioned the car's occu-
pants; they were told that narcotics were being sold in the apartment and that sales were
not limited to regular customers. Id. at 484.
9 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
10 Id. Upon being admitted to the apartment, the agent observed a man sitting in a
chair who was pointing a cocked semi-automatic weapon in his general direction. Id. The
defendant, MacDonald, was sitting and counting money, but had a .357 magnum revolver
within his reach. Id. The agent also observed four other men and large quantities of drugs in
the apartment. Id.
12 Id.
" Id. at 776 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
" United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. United
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071
(1991).
14 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
15 Id.
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money, and narcotics that were in plain view. 16
Following a jury trial, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York entered judgment convicting Mac-
Donald of several drug-related offenses. I" On appeal, a divided
panel of the Second Circuit determined that the evidence seized
from the apartment should have been excluded from MacDonald's
trial because of the agents' failure to obtain a warrant. I8 Consider-
ation en banc was granted, and the court of appeals vacated the
panel decision and affirmed the district court's judgment of
conviction.' 9
Writing for the court, Judge Altimari made the following de-
terminations: (1) the agent who made the controlled purchase was
authorized to arrest the occupants of the apartment at the time of
the purchase, 0 and a mere ten-minute absence from the premises
did not render the agent's lawful reentry subject to a requirement
that he first obtain a warrant;2 (2) exigent circumstances justify-
ing a warrantless entry existed once the undercover agent had
firsthand knowledge of the suspects' undertakings inside the apart-
ment;22 and (3) in any event, the task force agents acted properly
16 Id. The sixth man had apparently departed from the apartment during the interval
between the undercover agent's exit and his return with reinforcements. Id.
17 Id. at 767. MacDonald was convicted "of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and of the use
of a firearm in connection with a narcotics offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2."
Id.
1s See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482, 490 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. United
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071
(1991). The court criticized the task force agents for their failure to secure a warrant, noting
that the agents did not even discuss the possibility of contacting a magistrate. Id. Conclud-
ing that no "urgent need" for warrantless entry existed, the court remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of whether the defendant, who did not own the apartment,
had standing to challenge the entry as one who occupied the premises and "had dominion
and control over them by leave of the owner." Id.
' MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 767.
'o Id. at 771. Law enforcement officials, without a warrant and acting as private citi-
zens, may accept an invitation to enter a person's home to transact unlawful business "with-
out infringing upon the occupant's fourth amendment rights." United States v. Davis, 646
F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981); accord 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES,
supra note 2, § 6.1(c), at 582.
21 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771. "This is not the kind of scenario that needs the de-
tached judgment of a neutral magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause for an
arrest and search." Id.
22 Id. at 770. The court stated that this finding was "[c]onsistent with well-settled law."
Id. But see id. at 773 (Kearse, J., dissenting). "I know of no law, settled or otherwise, that
mere firsthand knowledge of a crime constitutes exigent circumstances permitting a war-
rantless entry." Id.
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in seeking to question the occupants of the premises without first
obtaining a warrant, 2  and the resulting commotion from within
the apartment justified their forced entry as a necessary means to
prevent the destruction of evidence.24 Judge Altimari stated that
the court would not engage in "futile speculation" as to whether
the agents had manufactured an exigency.25 He held that as long as
law enforcement agents do not act "unlawfully," their creation of
exigent circumstances should be deemed appropriate.28
Judge Kearse, in a dissent joined by Judge Feinberg and Chief
Judge Oakes, disputed each of the majority's justifications for the
warrantless entry.2 7 She contended that the agents' entry was ille-
gal because their return to the apartment was merely a pretext
designed "to precipitate a crisis that did not then exist. '28 The dis-
sent condemned the majority's endorsement of the agents' actions,
observing that it would result in the practical elimination of the
warrant requirement in narcotics cases. 29
The MacDonald court's decision, seemingly praiseworthy in
light of the gravity of the offense and the certainty of the defend-
ant's guilt, must be viewed with an eye towards its long-term ef-
fects. In the process of affirming the defendant's conviction for sev-
23 Id. at 771. "The fact that the suspects may reasonably be expected to behave illegally
does not prevent law enforcement agents from acting lawfully to afford the suspects the
opportunity to do so." Id.
24 See id. at 770 (district court's finding that danger of destruction of evidence existed
is not clearly erroneous); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 833 (1973). "When government agents... believe contraband is present and...
they reasonably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can
secure a search warrant, a warrantless search is justified." Id.
25 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 773 (Kearse, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the court had erred in
finding that the undercover agent was not required to secure a warrant to reenter the prem-
ises after he had left. Id. Judge Kearse reasoned that the agent's presence in the apartment
was lawful because it was with the occupants' consent, but argued that there was "no basis
for inferring" that this consent extended to the agent's return. Id. at 773-74 (Kearse, J.,
dissenting). In addition, the dissent argued that by concluding that an exigency was present
when the undercover agent gained knowledge of the activities within the apartment, the
majority had confused exigent circumstances sufficient for a warrantless entry with the mere
existence of probable cause. Id. at 773 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Finally, contending that the
exigent circumstances that did arise were deliberately created by the agents, the dissent
urged that the court "should not endorse such contrivances by law enforcement officials in
their efforts to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." Id. at 776
(Kearse, J., dissenting).
28 Id.
'9 Id. at 776-77 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
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eral drug-related crimes, the Second Circuit has unnecessarily
provided law enforcement officials, many of whom view the war-
rant requirement as a nuisance, 0 with a convenient method of
bypassing this fundamental constitutional protection. This Com-
ment will evaluate the various justifications for the agents' war-
rantless entry set forth by the MacDonald court. In addition, the
court's treatment of the exigent-circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement will be considered in light of the objectives
that inspired the adoption of the fourth amendment. Finally, this
Comment will conclude that the Second Circuit could have satis-
fied the legitimate needs of law enforcement without compromising
fourth amendment guarantees by applying the consent exception
to the warrant requirement.
I. THE EXIGENT-CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
The Second Circuit determined that the agents' warrantless
entry into private premises was justified by exigent circum-
stances. 1 It is suggested, however, that the court's interpretation
of exigent circumstances unduly enlarges this exception to the war-
rant requirement at the expense of fourth amendment protections.
A. The Inherent Exigency
The court determined that exigent circumstances existed once
the undercover agent gained firsthand knowledge of the activities
occurring within the apartment.3 2 Referring to "the volatile mix of
8o See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (sole reason for failure
to obtain warrant was inconvenience to officers); see also 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARcHEs, supra
note 2, § 8.1, at 147. Law enforcement officials generally "believe that the search warrant
procedure is overly technical and time-consuming and that it has no corresponding advan-
tages for them or meaningful protections for the individual." Id. (quoting L. TIFFANY, D.
McIbrzRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETCTION OF CRm 159 (1967)).
'1 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770-71.
Id. at 770. In determining whether exigent circumstances existed, the court consid-
ered factors originally set forth in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
(1) whether "a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence"; (2)
whether "the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed"; (3) whether strong probable cause
exists "to believe that the suspect committed the crime involved"; (4) whether there is a
"strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered"; (5) whether
there is a "likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended"; and (6)
whether "the entry ... is made peaceably." Id. at 392-93. In addition, the Dorman court
stated that the time of entry was another factor to consider; the delay that is incidental to
obtaining a warrant at night may sometimes justify proceeding without a warrant. See id. at
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drug sales, loaded weapons and likely drug abuse" on the premises,
the court found that the situation presented "a clear and immedi-
ate danger to the law enforcement agents and the public at
large.""3 Additionally, the court's opinion focused upon the con-
venient means available to the suspects for disposing of the evi-
dence of their operation s4 and stressed the excessive amount of
393; see also United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (considering diffi-
culty of obtaining warrant on Sunday morning). Alternatively, the late hour of entry may
signal its impropriety. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 393; see also United States v. Campbell, 581
F.2d 22, 26 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978) (nighttime entry increases government's burden to show
reasonableness).
Determining that "all of the Dorman factors were present," the MacDonald court con-
cluded that the agents' entry into the apartment without a warrant was proper. MacDonald,
916 F.2d at 770. The court's interpretation of at least two of the elements set forth in
Dorman, however, seems questionable.
In considering the possibility that the suspects would "escape if not swiftly appre-
hended," the court stated that this likelihood was confirmed by the fact that one of the
occupants of the apartment "escaped" before the agents returned to the premises. Id. The
court's finding that this "escape" element was satisfied when the suspects were completely
unaware that a need to escape existed, combined with the stability of the ongoing criminal
operation, makes it difficult to imagine a scenario in which this factor would be found lack-
ing. See id. at 775 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Moreover, this construction is inconsistent with
many cases, including Dorman, that indicate that the likelihood of escape exists when the
situation involves an "alerted criminal bent on flight." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 462 (1971); see also United States v. Miles, 889 F.2d 382, 383 (2d Cir. 1989) (inform-
ant's extended absence may have alerted suspects to imminent arrest); Campbell, 581 F.2d
at 26 (reasonable grounds to believe that suspects were aware of associate's arrest); Dorman,
435 F.2d at 388 (robbery suspect left identification papers at crime scene).
The court's apparent struggle to manipulate the facts before it to satisfy all of the
Dorman elements is also evidenced by its assertion that the "peaceful entry" factor was
satisfied by the agents' act of knocking on the door before battering it down. MacDonald,
916 F.2d at 770; cf. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2798 (1990) (valid entry by police
when admitted by person erroneously believed to be cotenant); Dorman, 435 F.2d at 388
(officers admitted to premises by defendant's mother).
The court in MacDonald went to unnecessary lengths in finding each Dorman element
satisfied because the presence of all of the factors is not required for a court to hold that an
exigency existed. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770; United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267,
270 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez,
686 F.2d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 1982). By attempting to prove too much, the court has provided
critics with an outstanding illustration of the ineffectiveness of the Dorman factors as tools
to be used by the judiciary and by law enforcement officers in determining the existence of
exigent circumstances. See 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 6.1(f), at 599-600
(Dorman rule requires "making of on-the-spot decisions by a complicated weighing and bal-
ancing of a multitude of imprecise factors"); Harbaugh & Faust, "Knock On Any
Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 DicK. L. REv. 191, 224-25 (1982)
(Dorman test is of no practical use for police); Note, supra note 4, at 180 (courts adhering to
Dorman generally find exigent circumstances in warrantless entry cases).
11 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
U See id. The suspects apparently had access to another apartment in the building,
which the agents could not identify, and might have been able to move the narcotics there.
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time that would have been required for the agents to obtain a
warrant.3 5
For the most part, the concerns expressed by the court reflect
"'the realities of drug transactions' "38 and evidence an under-
standable regard for law enforcement officials who must confront
this country's grave drug crisis on a daily basis.3 7 It must be recog-
nized, however, that although exigent circumstances may often
arise in the course of apprehending drug dealers, a violation of the
narcotics laws does not of itself create the type of emergency that
justifies a warrantless entry.,38 The term "exigent circumstances"
signifies the existence of an "immediate major crisis" that de-
Id. The court also noted that the drugs could easily have been flushed down the toilet and
that the prerecorded five dollar bill could have been lost in subsequent transactions. Id.
"5 See id. The existing exigencies would have been "aggravated by the additional time
required for, and the impracticability of, obtaining a warrant at the late hour of the day."
Id.; see also United States v. Farra, 725 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (substantial risk of loss
of evidence outweighs failure to procure middle-of-the-night warrant). But see United
States v. Segura, 468 U.S. 796, 818 n.1 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Following the Segura
decision, the U.S. Attorney's Office circulated an internal memorandum emphasizing that
search warrants should be sought whenever possible, regardless of the hour. Id. (citing Brief
for the United States 40 n.23); McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455 (delay and inconvenience of
obtaining warrant does not justify bypass of constitutional requirement).
" United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 458 (7th Cir.) (quoting district court), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987).
3 See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772. "To disallow the exigent circumstances exception
in... [drug] cases would be to tie the hands of law enforcement agents who are entrusted
with the responsibility of combatting grave, ongoing crimes ...." Id.
In support of the court's concerns, law enforcement officers have "increasingly [become]
the targets of drug-related violence" in recent years. Morgenthau, Losing the War?, NEws-
WEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 16; see also Belated Justice, TmE, Aug. 13, 1990, at 36 (drug king-
pins plotted to have drug enforcement agent kidnapped and tortured).
" See Diaz, 814 F.2d at 458 (no emergency in context of drug transaction); United
States v. Montano, 613 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1980) (drug-oriented offenses not equivalent
to exigency); see also United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C.), afl'd, 479 F.2d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
While to some, the exigency of the drug situation may suggest that a loosening of
the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment is in order, this Court will not prosti-
tute the protections of the Bill of Rights in the name of urgency or any other
name. The battle to rid society of illicit drugs must be won within the framework
of our Constitution lest we achieve a pyrrhic victory. The streets must be rid of
the pusher, but not at the expense of justice, nor by compromise of individual
liberty.
Id.; cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (fact that serious offense is under inves-
tigation does not create exigency). But see United States v. Miles, 889 F.2d 382, 383 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding exigent circumstances in case of drug possession with intent to distribute);
United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir.) (finding exigency based on practices
of drug dealers), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 929 (1988).
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mands action without delay.39 The existence of such an emergency
in MacDonald is belied by the fact that the suspects were carrying
on business as usual, unaware that the authorities had discovered
their criminal activity.40 While it is clear that high priority must be
accorded to fighting the drug epidemic in this country, it is equally
certain that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry do
not arise simply because the offense under investigation is a seri-
ous one.
4
'
B. The Manufactured Exigency
The MacDonald court bolstered its exigency argument by as-
serting that the agents, after informing the suspects of their pres-
ence, justifiably forced entry to prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence. 42 It is well settled that a warrantless entry is permissi-
ble if law enforcement officials "reasonably conclude that ... evi-
dence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search
warrant. '4 However, as a caveat to this principle, it has also been
39 See United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing exigent circumstances).
40 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 775 (Kearse, J., dissenting); see also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (warrantless entry illegal despite fact that distinct odor of
opium smoke was detected from outside door). "No reason, except inconvenience of the
officers and delay in preparing papers and getting before a magistrate, appears for the fail-
ure to seek a search warrant." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). "But
those reasons are no justification for by-passing the constitutional requirement . . . ." Id.;
see also 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 6.5(b), at 660. "[I]f nothing has occurred
which could be expected to alert the persons inside the premises that they were the object of
police suspicion, the mere fact that persons are inside with evidence of a destructible nature
is no basis for a warrantless search." Id.
41 See Montano, 613 F.2d at 151; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
455 (1971).
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal
subversion.... basic [fourth amendment] law and the values that it represents
may appear unrealistic or "extravagant" to some. But the values were those of the
authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike
our own they won-by legal and constitutional means in England, and by revolu-
tion on this continent-a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions by
official power. If times have changed, reducing everyman's scope to do as he
pleases in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made the values served
by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.
Id. (citations omitted).
'" MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771.
4' United States v. Rosseli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting United States v.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973)); see also United States
v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980) (warrantless entry justified by sounds indicating
destruction of evidence), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
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established that failure to obtain a warrant is inexcusable when
law enforcement officers go out of their way to create the circum-
stances that they allege constituted an emergency.44
In MacDonald, the suspects had been operating a narcotics
trafficking operation from the same apartment for approximately
four months.45 There was no indication that the suspects were
aware that they were under surveillance or that the agents' pres-
ence in the vicinity might arouse suspicion.46 In short, prior to the
agents' knocking on the door, there was no reason to fear the loss
of essential evidence.47 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit endorsed
the agents' actions by stating that "the fact that . . . [an] agent
may be 'interested' in having the occupants react in a way that
provides exigent circumstances and may 'fully expect[]' such a re-
action does not invalidate action that is otherwise lawful. 48
The defendant in MacDonald, maintaining that the Second
Circuit had condemned the intentional creation of exigencies in
United States v. Segura,49 argued that the evidence seized from
the apartment should have been suppressed.5 0 The MacDonald
court distinguished Segura,51 however, and observed that a prior
case denouncing government-created exigencies, which was cited
by the Segura court, had alluded to "illegal conduct" by law en-
forcement officials. 52 Law enforcement agents "do not impermissi-
" See United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds,
468 U.S. 796 (1984); see also Gomez, 633 F.2d at 1006 (courts should be alert to officers'
attempts to create exigencies); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir. 1974)
(officers improperly created exigency by making their presence known to suspects). See gen-
erally 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARcHES, supra note 2, § 6.5(b), at 662 (discussing manufactured
exigencies).
,5 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 775 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
46 Id.
'7 Id. at 776 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 772; see also Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990) (officer's expec-
tation of finding particular item does not invalidate its seizure).
4' 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981), a/I'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
80 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
81 Id. at 772
52 Id. (citing United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980)). The passage
upon which the MacDonald court focused reads as follows: "What police may not do, of
course, is create their own exigencies through illegal conduct and then 'secure' the premises
on the theory that the occupants would otherwise destroy evidence or flee." Allard, 634 F.2d
at 1187.
It should be noted, however, that the Allard court was concerned with illegal seizure of
evidence rather than the propriety of government-created exigencies. See id. at 1184-87. In
addition, the cases cited in Allard to support the proposition in question do not indicate
that improper creation of exigencies is limited to acts that are in themselves illegal. See id.
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bly create exigent circumstances," the court concluded, when they
"act in an entirely lawful manner."'
By holding that law enforcement officials may properly make a
warrantless entry by creating an exigency through any act that is
not in itself illegal, the Second Circuit has expanded the exception
to the point of eliminating the rule.5 4 Furthermore, the court's ba-
sis for distinguishing Segura is untenable. Although the MacDon-
ald court asserted that Segura should be read to proscribe only
exigencies created by illegal government conduct, it is clear that
Segura made no such distinction.5 In fact, the Segura court stated
that to allow agents to create an exigency by knocking on a sus-
pect's door and alerting him to their presence would allow "too
easy a by-pass of the constitutional [warrant] requirement." 56
It seems quite possible that the MacDonald court's expansive
opinion will lead to more obtrusive conduct on the part of law en-
forcement officials.5 While it is clear that courts must refrain from
at 1187 (citing United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 550 (6th Cir.) (Merritt, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301, 1304 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
Segura court quoted the above passage from Allard, but omitted the words "illegal con-
duct." See Segura, 663 F.2d at 415. Therefore, it is questionable for the Second Circuit to
assert that "the holding in Segura was based on... [a] principle," MacDonald, 916 F.2d at
772, that the Segura court seems to have intentionally excluded from its opinion.
51 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974). "[This type of
situation may reoccur repeatedly and might lend itself to too easy a by-pass of the constitu-
tional requirement that probable cause should generally be assessed by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate before the citizen's privacy is invaded." Id.
5 See Segura, 663 F.2d at 415. The Segura court found the agents' entry unjustified
because there was "no need to drag Segura to his apartment or to knock at the door." See
id. The court expressed no opinion, however, regarding the legality of these acts apart from
the entry. See id. To the contrary, the Segura court implied that the "entry was... unlaw-
ful" because no exigent circumstances existed, not because the acts of the law enforcement
agents were unlawful in themselves. See id.
56 Id. at 417 (quoting Rosselli, 506 F.2d at 630); see also supra note 54 (quoting
Rosselli).
N See Flumenbaum & Karp, Second Circuit Review, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1990, at 6, col
1. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948), the Supreme Court summarized
why we should be wary of allocating too much latitude to law enforcement officers:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous of-
ficers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime .... Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of
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unduly burdening law officers in the performance of their duties,58
the MacDonald court, by providing such a convenient means of
avoiding the warrant requirement, has significantly undermined
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects." 59
II. THE CONSENT EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Second Circuit's broad interpretation of exigent-circum-
stances was unnecessary in light of the existence of the consent
exception to the warrant requirement. The consent exception could
have been applied by the court as a less-expansive means to justify
the agents' warrantless entry. As Judge Kearse noted: "Consent
and exigent circumstances are separate exceptions to the warrant
requirement and should not be confused." 60
Law enforcement officials need not secure a warrant to enter a
person's home if they receive valid consent to their entry.6 In ad-
grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper
showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in rea-
sonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id.; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) ("history shows
that ... police acting on their own cannot be trusted"); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 415 (1974) ("pervasiveness and discontrol of
police discretion is everywhere acknowledged"); Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Prac-
tical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 672 (procedure al-
lowing police to make probable cause determination would lend itself "to police harassment
of unpopular groups").
'8 See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709 (1948), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). "The Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect both the innocent and the guilty from unreasonable intrusions upon
their right of privacy while leaving adequate room for the necessary processes of law en-
forcement." Id.; see also Note, supra note 57, at 658. "[A] balance must be struck under the
fourth amendment between society's interest in effective law enforcement and the individ-
ual's interest in privacy in the home." Id.
" U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
eo MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 773 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
"' See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (exception to both
probable cause and warrant requirements is search conducted with valid consent); United
States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1984) (warrantless arrest in home is valid if
there was consent to enter). Courts have upheld otherwise legitimate warrantless entries
even when a law enforcement officer obtained consent by concealing his true identity. See 3
W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 8.2(m), at 223. The Supreme Court has indicated that
"when an individual gives consent to another to intrude into an area or activity otherwise
protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware that he will thereby reveal to this other person
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dition, courts have recognized that "a general public invitation to
enter" is extended by certain commercial enterprises, 2 and law en-
forcement officers are therefore not required to obtain express con-
sent or a warrant before entering such establishments during busi-
ness hours. 3
In MacDonald, the undercover agent demonstrated that the
apartment under surveillance was being used for the sale of narcot-
ics 6 4 and that admission was granted to virtually anyone appearing
either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct," the mere fact that the law enforce-
ment officer misrepresented or failed to reveal his identity does not invalidate the consent.
Id.; see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1966) (evidence admissible when
defendant invites undercover agent into his home for drug transaction).
A different type of case is presented when consent is given to one who is known to be an
officer, but there is a deception as to the officer's purpose in gaining entry. See 1 W. LAFAvE
& J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10, at 348 (1984). "[T]here are decisions upholding the
entry-by-consent even though it is clear that the police failed to reveal their purpose and
even contributed to the consenter's ignorance of it by stating that they only wanted to talk
to the person that they then arrested." 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 6.1(c), at
583. However, there is authority that indicates that a party's consent will be considered
invalid "when the police misrepresentation of purpose is so extreme that it deprives the
individual of the ability to make a fair assessment of the need to surrender his privacy." 1
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra.
Although consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the burden of
showing the validity of consent is on the prosecutor. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222. In
order to meet his burden, a prosecutor must demonstrate that consent was "freely and vol-
untarily given." Id. (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). See gen-
erally 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, §§ 8.1-8.6 (detailed analysis of consent
searches).
62 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 2.4(b), at 429 (quoting United States v.
Berrett, 513 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975)).
11 Id. at 429-33; see also United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1978)
("warrantless arrest... was lawful since it was consummated in... [defendant's] business
establishment during business hours").
" See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom.
United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1071 (1991). Obviously, the undercover agent's controlled purchase, combined with the ob-
servations of the task force during its surveillance of the apartment, provided sufficient evi-
dence that drug trafficking activities were being conducted within the premises. See id.
Moreover, the contents of the apartment provided evidence that the property was used pri-
marily as a base for the distribution of narcotics and did not serve as an actual residence.
See id. During testimony, the undercover agent provided the following description of the
premises:
The apartment had only one closet; there were no clothes in it. In the kitchen area
there was a refrigerator; it had nothing in it but an ice tray. There was a stove; but
there were no pots or other cooking utensils. In the bathroom, there were no
toothbrushes, razors, or other toiletries. In the living room there were two love
seats; but there was no pull-out couch.
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at the door.65 Thus, since the premises were clearly employed as a
place of business, it follows that the occupants were not entitled to
the same degree of fourth amendment protections as would be af-
forded to the occupants of "a bona fide dwelling place." '68
Furthermore, common sense dictates that if the agents had
chosen to apply for a warrant and their application had been de-
nied, they could have gained admission to the apartment simply by
sending one or more of their number to pose as drug purchasers.6 7
Under similar circumstances, other courts have observed that no
purpose is served by requiring a warrant if the same invasion will
occur whether or not the warrant is issued. 8 In sum, it appears
that since the undercover agent actually observed the defendant's
activities within the premises and "exited only to secure proper
protection,"69 the Second Circuit correctly concluded that this was
68 See id. ("sales were not being limited to regular customers").
66 See People v. Sperber, 40 Misc. 2d 13, 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
1st Dep't 1963), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 566, 203 N.E.2d 219, 254 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1964); see also
United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1976) (business premises "are not enti-
tled to the same protection which is afforded a home"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977);
United States v. Ressler, 536 F.2d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 1976) (defendants "converted their
home into a 'commercial center' not protected by the Fourth Amendment") (quoting Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)); Handsford v. United States, 410 F.2d 733, 734
(5th Cir. 1969) (home "loses its broad range of constitutional protections" when "outsiders
are invited in to transact business").
When the occupants of a premises, although running a club or business, admit only
certain persons, then "the 'implied invitation' to enter extends only to such persons." See 1
W. LAFAvE, SEARCHES, supra note 2, § 2.4(b), at 432. However, "the actual practice as to
admitting persons into such facilities must be considered in making the determination of
whether there was in fact a justified expectation of privacy therein." Id. at 432-33; cf.
United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1975) (brothel, which granted admit-
tance to virtually anyone who came to the door, was a public place and not a dwelling), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
'T See United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 706 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1983).
66 See id.; United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857
(1987). In Diaz, the defendant admitted an undercover agent into his hotel room, purport-
edly to inspect cocaine in anticipation of a purchase. Id. at 455-56. The agent exited the
room, but returned immediately with other officers to make the arrest. Id. Observing that
the agent would have been admitted back into the hotel room, the court determined that
"the fact that he was assisted by other law enforcement officers . . . cannot make a consti-
tutional difference." Id. at 459.
According to the court, the defendant's consent to the agent's presence within the room
did not terminate during the agent's short absence. Id. The Seventh Circuit cautioned, how-
ever, that "this doctrine of 'consent once removed' [applies] only where the agent (or in-
formant) entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent, at that
point established the existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search, and im-
mediately summoned help from other officers." Id.
"9 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771.
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"not the kind of scenario that need[ed] the detached judgment of a
neutral magistrate. 7 °
CONCLUSION
It is fundamental that warrantless entries into private prem-
ises are unconstitutional unless made pursuant to certain recog-
nized exceptions. In MacDonald, the Second Circuit upheld a war-
rantless entry made by law enforcement officers by broadly
interpreting the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant re-
quirement. Unfortunately, the court failed to realize that it could
have avoided such an expansive construction by simply invoking
the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Through its in-
terpretation of what constitutes exigent circumstances and its ap-
proval of government-created exigencies, the Second Circuit ap-
pears to have diluted the warrant requirement to the point of
negating the fourth amendment's force in drug-related cases.
Peter E. Donohue
70 Id.
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